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Abstract 
Recent conflicts between big content and service providers (CSPs) like Netflix, transit providers (TPs), 
and Internet service providers (ISPs) have generated considerate media attention and ignited a debate on 
interconnection agreements, market power of last-mile ISPs and net neutrality. We propose an 
experimental design to analyze a stylized interconnection market that captures key aspects of actual 
interconnection markets with a focus on the entry of big CSPs. Participants are invited to assume the roles 
of ISPs, TPs and CSPs in a computer-aided laboratory experiment. The experiment serves to evaluate 
potential regulatory tools like transparency and interconnection obligation with respect to the efficiency of 
the overall interconnection market. Furthermore, we present results of a pre-test of the experimental 
design and the software implementation. Our preliminary results indicate that operators underinvest into 
network infrastructure and do not realize the full potential of mutual peering agreements when a CSP 
participates in the market. 
Keywords: Experimental economics, firm performance, future of IS, information economics, Internet, 
Internet economics, IS economics, IS/IT architecture, IT infrastructure 
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Introduction 
In 1950 the National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET) shut down the existing Internet backbone 
services and the transition towards a commercially driven Internet backbone began. To guarantee a 
universal access service, Internet service providers (ISPs) all over the world rely on interconnecting with 
each other. Those interconnection agreements usually have the form of transit or peering agreements. 
Transit agreements are typically made with larger operators and include the connectivity to the whole 
Internet for a certain price per megabit per second. Peering agreements on the other hand cover only the 
connectivity between the two interconnecting network operators and require the installation of a direct 
physical connection between them. Peering is a way to reduce transit costs for the amount of traffic that is 
exchanged between two peering partners. Peering relationships are traditionally so-called “bill-and-keep” 
agreements, which have the form of settlement free interconnection (Economides, 2006). However, in 
recent times paid peering emerged as an alternative form of interconnection agreement. In contrast to 
usual (settlement free) peering agreements, one peering partner is paying the other peering partner for 
the exchange of traffic between the two networks. Paid peering can emerge if the traffic ratio between two 
network operators is not balanced, but asymmetric in nature (Besen et al., 2001). Although there is a lot of 
public information available, the current interconnection agreements and the resulting market 
performance are by no means transparent. Interconnection between operators is very often established by 
handshake deals and details of interconnection agreements are in most cases covered by non-disclosure 
agreements. Therefore it is very difficult for regulators to judge if the market for network interconnection 
is free of market failures. 
With the rise of the net neutrality debate, a heated discussion about data transportation and non-
discrimination in the Internet began. Recent events indicate, that the discussion is not only relevant in 
local access networks, but in the backbone of the Internet as well. Since 2013 Netflix customers in the US 
complained more often that streaming quality during peak times was distorted with certain ISPs 
(Brodkin, 2014). Last-mile ISPs exert pressure on content and service providers (CSPs) like Netflix 
through implicit degradation of their transit business partners.  Netflix for instance relied heavily on the 
transit providers (TPs) Cogent and Level3 to deliver content to its subscribers. The last-mile ISPs 
Comcast, Verizon and AT&T did not invest sufficiently into the infrastructure facilitating the 
interconnection with those transit providers. As a result the user experience for Netflix subscribers that 
are also Comcast, Verizon and AT&T customers was severely degraded. The last-mile ISPs were willing to 
accept negative side effects on their own installed base to increase the pressure on Netflix and its service 
partners. Verizon representatives argued that they “are open to negotiation for a commercially reasonable 
solution that works for both parties.” (Brodkin, 2014). According to a recent traffic analysis (Sandvine, 
2013) Netflix was accounting for 31.6% of the North American fixed line downstream traffic at that time. 
In July 2013 the European providers Orange, Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica were under suspicion by 
the European Commission to abuse market power in negotiations with CSPs and their offices were raided 
to find further evidence (Reuters, 2013). Despite the development in Europe, Netflix and Comcast in the 
US agreed on a direct paid peering relationship on February 23 2014 and now Netflix pays for high-
quality access to the Comcast Internet user installed base. On April 29 2014 Netflix confirmed that it 
reached an agreement with Verizon as well and soon after also with AT&T (similar to the deal with 
Comcast). Such procedures are and were never at odds with any Net Neutrality rules in the US. However, 
Netflix is arguing that those additional payments to last-mile ISPs are nothing else than tolls (c.f. Krämer 
et al. 2013) and net neutrality regulation should also cover the interconnection agreements between 
operators in the backbone of the Internet. 
Our paper proposes an experimental economics approach to analyze the interconnection market with a 
special focus on the entry of big CSPs like Netflix. We propose a design for a laboratory experiment in 
which participants are invited to play the role of ISPs, TPs and CSPs in a computer simulation in an 
(virtual) Internet interconnection market. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First we 
outline our research questions and the related literature. In the second section we derive our hypotheses 
and continue with a detailed description of the experimental setup, the timing of events, the relevant 
parameters and the implementation of the experiment. We conclude with the results of our first pre-test 
and an outlook on the calibration of a final experimental setup. 
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Research Questions 
With the rise of big CSPs, last-mile ISPs are confronted with new players generating high revenue streams 
from their installed base. However, those new players have no direct access to their customers and rely on 
the infrastructure of last-mile ISPs to deliver content to their subscribers. Furthermore, last-mile ISPs 
(telecommunications providers) are under pressure, because their historic revenue streams (voice, 
messaging, TV) are eroding due to over the top (OTT) players like Netflix. Last-mile ISPs argue that 
eroding revenues and imbalanced traffic ratios on the CSP side of the market are forcing them to abandon 
the established form of interconnection in favor of paid direct relationships. Our research therefore 
addresses the following questions: 
1. Is there a systematic incentive to underinvest into network infrastructure to force CSPs to accept 
asymmetric interconnection deals? 
2. If there is market failure, can regulatory intervention help to improve the market outcome? 
3. Which regulatory tools (e.g., transparency- or interconnection obligations), if any, are useful to 
improve the situation? 
Related literature 
Cremer et al. (2000) study the incentive of large backbone providers to lower the interconnection quality 
with smaller competitors under Cournot competition. They find that larger providers have “suboptimal 
incentives to maintain connectivity” (p.435) and that interconnection degradation is more likely if the 
difference in market share is high. Since equally sized competitors do not gain a competitive advantage 
over their rivals through degradation, they do not find those incentives in a model with symmetric 
providers. Foros et al. (2005), in a closely related paper, look into the incentives of asymmetric ISPs to 
degrade interconnection quality as well. In contrast to Crémer et al. (2000) they find that a higher 
interconnection quality can increase the profits of the larger firm. That result is due to the consideration 
of the positive effect of the quality adjusted network-size. The network provider makes a trade-off 
between higher profits from locked-in customers against the loss in potential profits of non-acquired new 
customers. Mendelson and Shneorson (2003) extend the two-sided market approach by Laffont et al 
(2003) to peering when consumers have costs of delayed data transmission. As a result, operators have to 
trade off capacity costs and delay costs of consumers. The authors conclude that due to the advantage of 
larger networks, regulation might be necessary. However, in case of multiple symmetric networks, prices 
are set similarly to the ones a welfare-maximizing regulator would choose as well. Weiss and Shin (2003) 
focus on the asymmetry of traffic flows (e.g., between ISPs and CSPs). They find that the industry would 
adopt the maximum {inbound traffic volume, outbound traffic volume} rule; peering with smaller 
network operators would be more likely and the market would be more competitive. Jahn and Prüfer 
(2008) explicitly analyze paid peering as an additional form of interconnection between network 
operators under price competition. They find that for medium levels of asymmetry between networks paid 
peering dominates settlement-free peering and transit. However, for large levels of asymmetry providers 
interconnect via transit. The authors note, that market equilibria in their model not always yield desirable 
welfare outcomes. This is due to the fact, that the rise of paid peering shifts some consumer surplus to the 
network operators. Furthermore, if paid peering is facilitated via a variable fee and not only by a lump-
sum payment, paid peering is profitable for even larger levels of asymmetry. 
Our representation of the following experimental setup relies on graphs. Several papers deal with the 
problem of finding efficient equilibria in network formation under varying protocols of network formation 
and preference indication. Most closely related to our problem is a paper by Bloch and Jackson (2007), 
who look into the case of network formation with transfer payments. They find that the existence “…of 
positive externalities in payoffs may prevent the formation of efficient networks, because players involved 
in a link do not internalize the external effects the link has on other players” (p.104). However, the 
combinatorial problem that arises through the multitude of possible bilateral links between the players 
can only be solved by imposing additional restrictions on network formation. The existing theoretical 
literature supports that market power and the popularity of paid peering agreements should raise 
concerns over the efficiency of those markets. 
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Experiment 
We evaluate the regulatory tools transparency obligation and interconnection obligation in a stylized 
interconnection market that captures key aspects of the actual business relations (c.f. Sluijs et al. 2011, 
Henze et al. 2012). The main focus of our evaluation is on the efficiency of the overall interconnection 
market. For quantifying this value in the experiment, we rely on the numerical performance measures 
network coverage, interconnection capacity and monetary conditions of peering agreements. We state 
the following hypotheses for the treatment parameters transparency obligation and interconnection 
obligation: 
H 1: ISPs are more likely to postpone investments into interconnection capacity if the negotiation 
partner is a CSP or a TP serving a CSP. 
H 2: ISPs are more likely to demand paid peering if the negotiating partner is a CSP or TP serving a 
CSP. 
H 3: Compared to the benchmark case, a transparency obligation / interconnection obligation: 
 a) increases the total network coverage 
 b) increases the number of settlement-free peering agreements 
 c) decreases the fees for paid peering, if paid peering is established. 
Hypothesis 1 states that the likelihood of an ISP degrading the interconnection quality through 
postponing investments in the interconnection link is higher if it is negotiating with a CSP directly or a TP 
selling transit to a CSP. Hypothesis 2 states that negotiations with partners without direct access to 
content consuming customers more often end up with paid peering agreements in favor of the ISP. We 
want to find out, if the ISPs actually give up potential revenues by degradation and if this strategy is 
successful in forcing unfavorable deals onto TPs and/or CSPs. Hypotheses 3 a)-c) state that the effect of 
regulation on network coverage and peering agreements will be positive. This follows from a tendency to 
equal-split negotiation results known from the bargaining literature, which may be reinforced in a 
transparent market, because the information available on past negotiations provides a focal point that 
facilitates future negotiations. 
Design of the Peering Game 
Our stylized representation of a peering market is inspired by a simulation game introduced by industry 
advisor William Norton (Norton, 2009). The original game was tested with various industry experts and is 
considered as a fairly accurate representation of actual peering markets. However, our version of the 
game abstracts away from some of the particularities of the original design. To reduce noise in our data, 
we neither include Norton’s original chessboard type of network map, nor the geographically located 
interconnection points. Instead, we replace these elements by a single graph. Further, for the sake of 
control and replicability, we exogenously define the number of periods and employ formalized Güth et al. 
(1982) ultimatum game type of negotiations, instead of open oral peering negotiations. 
In our CSP setup of the experiment two subjects assume the roles of ISPs, two subjects assume the roles of 
TPs and one subject assumes the role of a CSP1. Each subject is graphically represented by a node in the 
network graph as depicted in Figure 1b. ISP and TP market coverage is represented by the size of their 
nodes, i.e. the size of a node is proportional to the ISP’s and TP’s network coverage. ISPs provide Internet 
access to end customers, while TPs provide Internet access to enterprise customers and CSPs. In contrast 
to ISPs and TPs, CSPs do not have unique customers, because all CSP customers are customers of an ISP 
as well. The CSP recruits its customers from the ISPs’ networks and unilaterally delivers services and 
content. The TPs’ customers are not purchasing any CSP’s services, because content is not targeted at 
enterprise customers. 
                                                   
1 That setup can be compared to the situation between Verizon/Comcast/AT&T (ISPs), Cogent/Level3 
(TPs) and Netflix (CSP). 
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In the beginning of the experiment, each ISP and each TP have market coverage of 20 customer fields. 
Each customer field generates revenue of 2,000 monetary units per period, which the owner of the 
customer field earns at the beginning of the period. Subjects can increase their coverage by acquiring 
additional customer fields at a linearly increasing cost for each marginal unit. This represents the firms’ 
infrastructure costs of extending their own coverage. The period-wise cost function for purchasing 
customer fields is chosen such that a purchase of 10 customer fields per period is optimal in the first 
period. This number decreases during the course of the game, as the number of periods with future 
revenues decreases. The total market size, however, is limited to 150 customer fields. After ten periods, 
given optimal investment decisions, the market of ISP and TP customers would be saturated and no 
additional customer fields could be acquired. In the original game by Norton, ISPs are not in competition 
for customers, because all customer fields yield equal profits independent of the number of ISPs covering 
the field. We introduce a more realistic setting, where ISPs and TPs are in competition for new customers. 
However, we do not allow firms to acquire existing customers from their competitors. Further, in contrast 
to end-users and “small” enterprise customers, big CSPs are flexible and can switch interconnection 
partners easily. 
ISPs and TPs, on the one hand, and CSPs, on the other hand, differ fundamentally from each other. Keep 
in mind that all customers of the CSP are customers of an ISP as well. To indicate that relation the share 
of ISP customers who are also CSP customers in figure 1b and 1c is shaded red. However, in turn, not all 
customers of an ISP are customers of the CSP. In contrast to ISPs and TPs the CSP does not have to invest 
into network coverage. The CSP covers an increasing percentage of the ISP’s customer fields, growing 
endogenously from 20 percent in the first period to 40 percent in the last. Therefore the CSP in our game 
does not have to invest into new customers because we abstract from advertisement costs in the model. In 
reality an ISP or TP has to make investments into network coverage and advertisement, whereas the CSP 
only has advertisement costs. We normalize the advertisement costs for all players to zero. As a result the 
ISP and TP players have to “buy” customer fields, whereas the CSP receives customer fields “for free”. 
For the ISPs and TPs customer fields, we assume a symmetric traffic pattern, which means inbound and 
outbound traffic are equal to each other. In practice inbound/outbound ratios up to 2:1 are considered as 
balanced in peering relations and the ratio in our model is assumed to be 1:1. When operators grow their 
networks by acquiring customer fields, network traffic between these operators increases, while the ratio 
of inbound and outbound traffic remains unchanged. To represent the relationship between network size 
and traffic in our model, the traffic between ISPs and TPs, is calculated as the sum of the number of 
customer fields of these operators. Therefore, ISPs and TPs equally contribute to the total units of traffic 
exchanged. CSPs, however, unilaterally send traffic into the ISPs’ networks, either directly or via a TP link. 
This results in an exceedingly high inbound/outbound ratio and excessive traffic increases caused by the 
increasing share of (video) content consuming end-users who predominantly request data.  To represent 
the asymmetric relationship, traffic of the CSP increases the overall traffic on the peering link between the 
TP and the ISP by the factor 5 for each CSP customer field. The same holds for direct traffic between CSPs 
and ISPs.  
The ISPs and TPs in our game represent operators who have already established peering connections 
among each other in the past. Therefore the ISP and TP networks are completely linked by preexisting 
peering connections. These connections induce costs of 20,000 monetary units per period, which are split 
equally among the peering operators by default. However, the preexisting agreements refer only to the 
status quo extent of network traffic plus a buffer of 50 percent above the current load. Once the network 
traffic increases, the operators are not obligated to provide any additional capacity. However the 
operators can choose to provide additional capacity at no cost and may make this capacity extension 
subject to a renegotiation of the peering agreement.2  
In the beginning of the game, the CSP has transit access to the Internet through transit, but does not 
possess any direct connections with the ISPs. Therefore, the CSP has to pay for the transit access for each 
customer field of the ISPs that it would like to access. The transit prices per period are set by the TPs in 
                                                   
2 In reality the provision of capacity requires investments into the extension of infrastructure at the 
interconnection points, such as routers and switches. As this cost is relatively low, we normalize it to zero 
in the experiment.  
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the first period of the game and can be adopted during the course of the game. In the experiment as in 
reality the CSP can purchase transit from multiple transit providers, which is also referred to as multi 
homing. The CSP player in the experiment decides on the split that defines how much of the generated 
traffic is purchased from TP 1 and TP 2 at their respective transit prices. The decision on the split of 
transit traffic can be revised by the CSP in any round, based on the current prices and network conditions. 
In the course of the game, ISPs and CSPs can agree on peering connections, which are represented by 
edges between the interconnected nodes as depicted by the solid lines in Figure 1 a)-c). In contrast to the 
transit connections between the CSP and the TPs, the establishment of new peering connections requires 
preceding investments into the underlying network infrastructure. For setting up a peering connection, 
each party has to make a lump sum investment of 10,000 monetary units. That representation allows us 
to incorporate the infrastructure investments of network providers in interconnection, without relying on 
explicit geographical location of customer fields and peering points like in the original peering simulation 
game by Norton. Once established, peering connections induce operating costs of 20,000 monetary units 
per period that must be paid by the peering parties. The split of these costs is determined in a negotiation 
that precedes the initial establishment of a peering connection. 
Subjects make their decisions sequentially one after another. At their turn, ISPs and TPs decide on their 
network investment in the current period and all subjects decide on the provision of additional capacity 
for the existing peering connections, and on the establishment and (re)negotiation of peering connections. 
Renegotiations allow the ISPs to account for the increasing share of CSP traffic during the course of the 
game. In addition, a TP decides on the transit price it offers to the CSP in the current period. ISPs and 
CSPs can send a peering offer to each other. When sending a new offer or requesting renegotiation, the 
two subjects involved enter into a Güth et al. (1982) ultimatum peering negotiation about the split of the 
future operating costs and a potential premium. The costs can be split in steps of 1 monetary unit in the 
interval from {0:20,000; 1:19,999;…; 20,000:0}. Any asymmetric split of costs results in paid peering 
relationships. Equal splits result in settlement-free peering. To account for above cost paid peering 
participants can also suggest a split of costs and add a premium fee on top of the costs {0; 1;..; 100,000} 
(c.f. Figure 1c). 
  
T= transit;   P= peering;   PP= paid peering above costs 
dashed line=possible connection;   solid line= active connection 
Figure 1a.  
Benchmark setup 
Figure 1b.  
CSP setup 
Figure 1c. 
Evolved network (CSP setup) 
In order to (passively) degrade the quality of interconnection to other players and impact their revenue 
streams, operators with existing peering connections can decide not to increase the connection capacity to 
other operators. Missing capacity results in quality degradation. Quality degradation itself requires no 
action except of not increasing capacity. In that sense, degradation is cost-free. But degradation harms the 
revenue from the installed base according to the market share of the degraded player, and thus imposes 
opportunity costs to the degrading as well as to the degraded player.3 We assume that quality degradation 
                                                   
3  Imagine there are only two ISPs and customers are connecting to other customers with equal 
probability. ISP A has five customer fields and ISP B has ten customer fields. If A degrades the transit 
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reduces the revenues linearly according to the number of customers. However, degradation first affects 
the CSP customers. Therefore it affects the CSP more strongly than an ISP, as all CSP customers are ISP 
customers, but not the other way around. In other words, degradation of the CSP harms only some 
customers of the ISP, but all customers of the CSP at that specific ISP. The revenues from newly acquired 
customer fields, the transit fees for newly acquired customer fields of the subjects, and the damages from 
passive degradation take effect with the beginning of the subsequent period. If negotiating parties 
successfully make a peering agreement, the connection and the terms of the agreement take effect with 
the beginning of the subsequent period. Once all subjects have taken their turn, a period is completed. 
The number of periods is limited to ten. 
Table 1 depicts the eight treatments of our 3x2 factorial experimental design with regulatory and market 
treatment parameters. Our regulatory treatment parameters are control, transparency obligation and 
interconnection obligation. The regulatory tools take on the form of extensions of the control treatment. 
Interaction effects between the regulatory tools are not investigated. In addition to which regulatory tool 
we employ, we define a treatment by which market structure we investigate. Our CSP setup features 
traditional ISPs and TPs as well as a CSP as described above, while in our benchmark setup the CSP is 
replaced by a third ISP who behaves like the existing ISPs except that it enters the market without 
preexisting peering connections and a smaller network size of 1 (c.f. Figure 1a). That benchmark allows us 
to compare the interconnection agreements that emerge between CSPs and ISPs with those agreements 
that may emerge between ISPs and ISPs in a similar situation (later entry to the market).  
 Benchmark Setup (c.f. Figure 1a) CSP Setup (c.f. Figure 1b) 
Control Details of peering agreements are under 
NDA. 
Details of peering agreements are under 
NDA. 
Transparency 
obligation 
Details of all existing peering agreements 
are visible to the other players before the 
negotiation phase. 
Details of all existing peering agreements 
are visible to the other players before the 
negotiation phase. 
Interconnection 
obligation 
Negotiation partners are not allowed to 
reject “reasonable” offers. 
Negotiation partners are not allowed to 
reject “reasonable” offers. 
Table 1. Experimental Treatments 
When no transparency obligation has been introduced, subjects naturally know their own negotiation 
history and all firms know each other’s regular price and revenue structure, but they do not know their 
competitors’ negotiation results and ISPs do not know the individual transit prices that TPs offer to the 
CSP. A transparency obligation makes this information available to all subjects: they see all opposing 
peering agreements including the split of the peering costs, the possible above cost premiums, and the 
transit prices. Thus, the network graph that is shown to the subjects contains more information in the 
transparency obligation setting. When entering further peering negotiations, subjects can take into 
account the additional information on what has been agreed on in similar situations and adopt their offers 
accordingly. 
In the interconnection obligation treatment, ISPs are not allowed to reject 0:20,000 offers by the CSPs, 
i.e. offers by the CSP to bear the full costs of a peering connection. Regulation does not dictate capacity 
investments and it does not exclude other peering agreements though. Therefore, CSPs may offer paid 
peering contracts with a premium payment above the peering costs in order to encourage the ISPs to 
provide future capacity of the peering links when the network traffic grows. 
Methodology and Implementation 
In order to test the hypotheses stated above, we employ a controlled laboratory experiment. Economic 
laboratory experiments are used to isolate the effect of economic parameters in actual human decision 
                                                                                                                                                                    
connection quality, A’s customers would take 2/3 of the damage, while B’s customers only bear 1/3 of the 
damage. 
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situations. Although the laboratory setting is necessarily only a stylized representation of reality, it can 
provide decision makers with complementary evidence about general mechanisms and potential pitfalls, 
which may remain relevant even in a more complicated situation. As Plott (1997) argues “If a mechanism 
does not work acceptably in a simple case created in a laboratory, then there may be no reason to think 
that it will work in the complex cases found in a field application.” (p. 607). Thus, one contribution of 
economic laboratory experiments is to provide a test bedding environment before a mechanism is rolled 
out on a larger scale. 
To induce an economic decision situation in a controlled way it is crucial to incentivize subjects with 
sufficient monetary rewards (Smith, 1976) and to ensure that all subjects understand the incentive 
structure and act accordingly (Schweitzer, 2012). In our experiment, the incentive structure is represented 
by experimental dollars that correspond to real money at a fixed exchange rate. At the end of the 
experiment one out of three repeated runs of the game is randomly selected for payoff. Additionally, the 
subjects receive a lump sum of 100 experimental dollars for their participation in the experiment. If they 
make a loss in the game round selected for payoff, the loss will be deducted from this lump sum. However, 
negative total payoffs are not possible. 
 
Figure 2. Screenshot of the experiment software in the benchmark 
with CSPs 
The subjects participating in the experiment are students at the participating universities. While critics of 
economic experiments argue that students are lacking the experience of professionals in their respective 
fields, Ball and Cech’s (1996) extensive review of experimental studies on this issue concludes that there is 
“little evidence for subject pool effects between students and market professionals acting as subjects in 
laboratory environments which strictly follow experimental economic precepts and test economic 
questions” (p. 257, emphasis in the source). 
The procedure of our experiment is as follows. Each group of subjects participates only in one regulatory 
treatment, which is repeated in a sequence of three games. In each of these games they are one of 
altogether five participants in a group. The composition of this group is determined randomly in advance 
of each game round (random stranger matching). Before the start of each game period the participants are 
informed about their respective roles. The subjects are instructed before the beginning of the experiment 
and a standardized test program at individual computer terminals at our computer laboratory is used to 
test their understanding. After the subjects’ comprehension of the decision situation is verified, the 
peering game is conducted at the same individual computer terminals. Communication between the 
subjects is not allowed. 
The experiment is implemented in a web-based software, which employs the same interface for the 
computer terminals in the laboratory as for an online version of the game that could be used for gathering 
data of subject pools that are outside the reach of typical lab experiments. Our general approach allows us 
to collect data in a controlled lab experiment with students, but also by inviting industry experts to 
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participate in our study via a web-based interface. All actions of the participants and all user interface 
events are immediately tracked and stored in a server-side database.  
Figure 2 provides a screenshot of the prototype. The network graph of the current game round is depicted 
in the right part of the screen and provides a one-glance graphical overview of the current status of the 
game. In addition, in the upper part of the screen, the subjects are provided with a summary of their 
current financial situation and, in the lower part of the screen, with a history of their own past decisions 
and interactions in the game. In the left part of the screen, subjects make their decisions for the respective 
game round. These decisions include the number of customer fields to acquire, the optional choice of a 
quality degradation value and the optional initiation of a peering negotiation. 
Results of the Pre-test 
The experimental software has been pre-tested with seven independent groups of four students each in 
June 2014. The pre-test delivered first impressions on how subjects deal with the network and peering 
situation and on how the game may be configured for the actual experiment. First, as depicted in Figure 3, 
there was a pronounced tendency to underinvest in the first three periods of the game. In the subsequent 
Periods 4 to 10, actual investments roughly resembled the theoretically optimal investments. Second, 
three of the seven groups managed to establish peering connections between all participating subjects. 
Remarkably, every subject established at least one peering connection. And third, the results of a paper-
based survey, conducted after the experiment, suggest that participation was perceived as immersive and 
the rules as self-explanatory. Note that the pre-test generates only preliminary results from a small 
sample of participants. The results were used to make important final design decisions and to calibrate 
the parameters for the actual experiment. The resulting design is still a simplified representation of the 
actual peering situation, but does capture many of the crucial aspects of the market dynamics in reality. 
 
Figure 3. Average investment into customer fields as 
compared to the optimum investment, (n= 7 groups). 
Outlook and Conclusion 
In this paper we presented an experimental design to analyze interconnection markets when CSPs 
negotiate for private peering with ISPs. We introduced the option to strategically withhold capacity 
expansions, as well as paid peering negotiations. Furthermore, we introduced possible regulatory 
interventions that will be tested in separate treatments of the experiment and benchmarked against the 
“old” status quo in interconnection markets. Our research will contribute to a better understanding of 
ISPs behavior in the changing interconnection environment and shed light on the question if 
interconnection markets suffer from market failure. The results can help practitioners and policy makers 
alike to understand the implications of the transition of the interconnection market that started with the 
rise of streaming video and culminated in the recent events around Netflix’s direct peering agreements. 
Our next steps include to conduct a second pre-test validating the treatment design and to conduct the full 
experiment afterwards.  
Economics of IS 
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